Defensive Liability Without Culpability by Bazargan-Forward, Saba
In The Ethics of Self-Defense / Published 2016 / 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190206086.003.0004 
 
1 
 
Chapter 4: 
Defensive Liability Without Culpability 
 
 
Saba Bazargan 
Department of Philosophy 
UC San Diego 
 
 
Abstract 
A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some 
responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose 
responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally 
responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful 
harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken 
in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful 
harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive 
impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and act 
on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that 
minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the 
harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis 
for liability. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Suppose you are considering whether to undertake an act that benefits you, 
but which imposes a nontrivial chance of harming an innocent—that is, 
someone who has not forfeited or waived her right against being harmed. 
This is a morally risky act. But suppose that given all the available evidence, 
undertaking this risk is morally justified; the expected value of undertaking it 
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is sufficiently higher than that of refraining from doing so. So you commit 
the morally risky act. Unfortunately, you—or more aptly, your innocent 
victim—is unlucky. The possible harm that makes the act morally risky 
manifests: you pose a threat to the innocent. Are you morally liable to be 
defensively harmed in such a case if doing so is necessary to avert the threat 
you pose? I will call someone in your position a “minimally responsible 
threatener” (MRT). Here are two canonical examples of minimally 
responsible threateners: 
The Conscientious Driver1 
A careful and conscientious driver is on her way to the cinema in a 
well-maintained car. Through no fault of her own, she hits a patch of 
black ice causing her to lose control of her car. She strikes and kills a 
pedestrian.  
The pedestrian in this example has done nothing to lose her right not to be 
harmed. The act of driving in this case is wrongful in the fact-relative sense 
since it is morally impermissible to drive on an occasion in which doing so 
will unjustly kill an innocent.2 Clearly, though, the driver is not to blame; 
she was engaging in a permissible type of activity, and (ex hypothesi) was 
doing so in as safe a manner as morality can reasonably demand of her. But 
she was in a position to recognize that even safe driving carries a small but 
substantial risk of imposing a wrongful harm on a pedestrian. 
Whereas the conscientious driver imposes a harm unintentionally, some 
MRTs do so intentionally: 
The Mistaken Resident3 
A serial killer is on a murder spree in a small town. Unbeknownst to 
anyone, she has an identical twin (who is herself unaware that the 
killer is her twin). One night the twin stops at a random house for 
assistance in jump-starting her car. The resident answers the door 
armed, because she knows the killer is on the loose. Seeing what 
appears to be the killer, the resident immediately shoots the twin in 
what she reasonably believes to be necessary and proportionate self-
defense. 
Killing the twin is impermissible in the fact-relative sense; the twin has done 
nothing to forfeit or waive her right not to be killed, and killing her does not 
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achieve any good. Yet the mistaken resident is not to blame since she was 
epistemically justified (though mistaken) in her belief that the twin posed a 
lethal threat. 
Are these MRTs morally liable to be killed in self-defense? To answer this, 
we have to take a closer look at liability. There are two broad conditions for 
moral liability (as I understand it). First, a person is morally liable to a harm 
only if imposing that harm on her is necessary to achieve a particular good.4 
For example, a person is liable to be harmed only if doing so will compensate 
someone she has wronged (in which case the person is liable to a 
compensatory harm), or if it will prevent the liable person from wrongfully 
committing a harm (in which case the person is liable to a defensive harm). 
Second, a person is liable to be harmed only if she has done something to 
forfeit her right not to be harmed. Consequently, the liable person would 
have no permission—not even an agent-relative one—to prevent the harm 
from being imposed on her, and no justified complaint against the harmer. 
These necessary conditions combine to form jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions for liability: a person is morally liable to a harm just in case (1) 
imposing that harm on her is necessary to achieve a particular good, and (2) 
she has forfeited her right not to be harmed in that way.5 
So to ask whether an MRT is morally liable to be harmed is to ask whether 
she has forfeited her right not to be harmed in furtherance of the 
achievement of some particular good. But to determine whether an MRT is 
liable to defensive or compensatory harms, we need a theory of liability. 
Various theories of liability have been developed over the past two decades. 
This includes Judith Jarvis Thomson’s right-based account of liability,6 
Michael Otsuka’s responsibility-based account7 (further developed and refined 
by Jeff McMahan8), Kimberly Ferzan’s culpability-based account,9 and 
Jonathan Quong’s status-based account.10 
Each of these accounts has been variously criticized; I won’t rehearse their 
problems here. Instead, I will address a particular challenge that proponents 
of the responsibility-based account must answer. According to that account, 
anyone who bears any degree of responsibility for a wrongful harm can be 
liable. Consequently, MRTs are liable to defensive harm. But how can acting 
scrupulously in accordance with the evidence-relative demands of morality 
result in a forfeiture of a right not to be harmed? 
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This is the challenge I address here. My strategy in doing so is to show that 
if we deny that MRTs are liable to defensive harms, then we have to deny 
that those who act in accordance with what is known in the law as the 
“defense of private necessity” owe compensation to those whose rights they 
have justifiably infringed.11 But first, I will outline in greater detail a 
particular responsibility-based account of the liability of MRTs. 
 
2. The Complex Account of Liability 
The fact that an MRT has voluntarily undertaken a course of action that has 
a nontrivial risk of resulting in a wrongful harm makes her somewhat 
responsible for that harm should it manifest. This responsibility grounds 
liability to defensive violence: should violence be necessary to avert the harm 
that the MRT poses, then she might be liable to such violence. This is 
despite the fact that it was morally permissible, in the evidence-relative 
sense, for the MRT to undertake the risk in question. She has, in effect, 
undertaken a moral gamble; should she (or more aptly, her victim) lose, the 
MRT will bear liability, since she, and not her victim, undertook the risk-
imposing a gamble. The conscientious driver and the mistaken resident, for 
instance, are liable since they rather than their victims chose to impose a risk 
on others for their own benefit. 
But what is the severity of the harm to which an MRT is liable? On what I 
call the “Simple Account of liability to defensive harms,” the party that is 
more morally responsible for a fact-relative wrongful threat is liable to suffer 
that degree of harm if necessary to prevent it from being imposed on her 
victim. On the “Complex Account of liability to defensive harms,” the degree 
of harm to which an individual is liable is concomitant with the degree of 
responsibility that she bears for the threat she poses.12 The less responsible 
an individual is for a lethal harm she imposes on an innocent, the less the 
degree of harm to which the responsible individual is potentially liable. 
Obviously, this simple description of a positive relation between degrees of 
responsibility and degrees of liability is compatible with a host of 
responsibility-to-liability functions, some of them only trivially differ from 
the Simple Account. I present a more precise specification of the Complex 
Account elsewhere.13 
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So though an MRT such as the conscientious driver or the mistaken resident 
has forfeited her right not to suffer the proportionate harms necessary to 
prevent the harms for which she is responsible, she has not forfeited her right 
not to be killed, even though she is posing a lethal threat. And this is because 
such MRTs conduct themselves in accordance with the demands of morality 
in that what they do is morally permissible in the evidence-relative sense. 
Consequently the degree of responsibility that they bear is not high enough 
to make them liable to be killed. So killing an MRT is a disproportionate 
means to or side effect of preventing the harms that she wrongfully poses. 
(That is, it violates the constraint of narrow proportionality.)14 
The Complex Account is, then, more restrictive than the Simple Account of 
liability. On the latter, any MRT is morally liable to be defensively killed if 
the threat she is posing is lethal. Michael Otsuka, a proponent of the Simple 
Account, writes that the mistaken resident is morally liable to be killed even 
though what she does is morally permissible in the evidence-relative sense: 
“[w]hen one is in possession of rational control over such a dangerous activity 
as the shooting of a gun at somebody, it is not unfair that if the person one 
endangers happens to be innocent, one is by virtue of engaging in such 
dangerous activity stripped of one’s moral immunity from being killed.”15 
Alternatively, on the Complex Account, there is a limit to the degree of harm 
to which an MRT can be liable. And this limit is determined in a principled 
way: by adverting to the degree of responsibility she bears for the harm in 
question. 
It is important to note that the Complex Account tells us only the maximum 
amount of harm to which an MRT is liable. This is because the constraint of 
necessity is internal to liability (as I have construed it)—an individual is 
liable to a harm only if imposing that harm on her averts, lessens, or 
redresses the harm for which she is responsible. So if merely painfully 
pinching an MRT such as the conscientious driver or the mistaken resident 
will avert the harm she will otherwise impose, then she is liable to no more 
than that painful pinch. But suppose, alternatively, nothing short of killing 
the MRT will avert the harm she is imposing; in this case, on the Complex 
Account, she is not liable to be killed, since that harm exceeds the maximum 
amount of harm to which she is liable. 
It is also important to note that the conscientious driver and the mistaken 
resident are not necessarily equally responsible for the threats they pose. The 
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resident, unlike the driver, chooses to kill a person intentionally. And this is 
a much greater moral risk than the one associated with driving. If moral 
responsibility for a fact-relative unjust harm is the basis of liability to 
defensive harm, and if the severity of the harm to which a wrongdoer is liable 
varies with her responsibility, then the mistaken resident is liable to more 
severe defensive action than the conscientious driver. 
I expect that many will find the Complex Account more plausible than the 
Simple Account. Though the Simple Account purports to leave theoretical 
space for responsibility to determine the severity of the harm to which an 
MRT is liable, it turns out on that account that anyone who is at all 
responsible for posing a lethal threat will be liable to be killed if that is the 
only way to stop her (provided, of course, that the lethal threat is unjust in 
the fact-relative sense). In my view this account is draconian—it effectively 
allows us to ignore the degree to which a threat is responsible (provided she 
bears some responsibility) when the only way to stop the aggressor is to kill 
her. 
But proponents of the Simple Account might allege that the Complex 
Account has an unpalatable consequence. Suppose that the only way that the 
identical twin can avert the threat that the lethal mistaken resident poses is 
by killing her. Or suppose that the only way the pedestrian can avert the 
threat that the driver poses is by killing him. It might seem that on the 
Simple Account the potential victims of the MRTs have no agent-neutral 
justification for defending themselves in these ways, since the MRTs are 
liable only to sublethal harms. 
But the Complex Account is compatible with an agent-neutral justification 
for the potential victims of the MRTs to defend themselves using lethal force 
if necessary. Imposing any necessary harm on an MRT above the amount to 
which she is liable might still be justifiable as the lesser evil, relative to the 
alternative of allowing the harm that the MRT is posing to befall her victim. 
This means that killing an MRT will be permissible when that is the only 
way to stop her, since it is better to kill someone who is liable to substantial 
but sublethal harms than it is to let her kill someone who is liable to nothing 
at all.16 This is a case where a person who is not liable to be killed can 
nonetheless be permissibly killed. 
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But some will criticize the Complex Account from the other direction. They 
will say that MRTs are not liable to any harms at all. (Defenders of the 
culpability-based account, for example, will make such a claim.) I will 
consider and respond to two such arguments tailored specifically to the sorts 
of MRTs under consideration before moving to a third, more general 
argument in the next section. 
In regard to the conscientious driver, one might argue that a pedestrian 
knowingly engages in a morally risky activity by having chosen to traverse 
near a street. So if a faultless accident occurs in which a harm has to befall 
either the pedestrian or the driver, the pedestrian will share some 
responsibility for this forced choice. 
But we need only change the example so that an individual’s risk of being 
struck by a car is much smaller than the driver’s risk of striking someone. 
Suppose the driver is in a third-world country, passing through a very poor 
village in which cars rarely appear. In this case, the risk of striking some 
pedestrian, though small, is much greater than the risk that any given 
pedestrian will have of being struck. This is because, in the example, there 
are far more “pedestrians” (i.e., villagers) than cars. We can stipulate both 
that (1) the risk imposed by the driver crosses the threshold at which the 
driver becomes liable to defensive attack should the risk materialize, and that 
(2) the risk assumed by any given villager does not cross the threshold at 
which the villager can be liable for the harm of being struck by a car. The 
propensity to being struck by a car while taking a walk in the village is so 
low that she cannot be said to have engaged in an activity that has a 
foreseeable risk of resulting in serious harm. As a result, she bears no 
responsibility for the accident. The responsibility and thus the liability are 
solely with the driver, who did indeed choose to engage in a risk-imposing 
activity. 
In regard to the example of mistaken resident, Ferzan rejects the argument 
that the resident and those like her have undertaken a gamble which places 
their “moral immunity on the line.” “After all,” Ferzan writes, “they are 
likewise taking a gamble if they do not defend themselves, and they are 
gambling with their lives.”17 She concludes from this that since morality does 
not demand that she err on the side of risking her own life, we should not 
hold her liable if it turns out that acting in apparent self-defense ends up 
imposing a fact-relative impermissible harm on an innocent. 
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It is true that if the resident chooses not to shoot she is gambling with her 
own life. So whether or not she shoots, she is taking a considerable risk. But 
there is a moral difference between gambling with one’s own life and 
gambling with the lives of others. If the resident chooses to shoot, she is 
risking the life of someone who might turn out to be an innocent. She is, in 
effect, gambling with the life of a possibly innocent person for self-interested 
reasons. To choose this gamble is to shift a risk away from herself and onto a 
possibly innocent person. If it turns out that this person is indeed innocent, 
then it is only fair that the aggressor—who took the gamble—bear some cost 
for harm that follows. 
   
3. The Argument from Unfairness  
Some cast doubt on the claim that those who impose harms justifiably in the 
evidence-relative sense can be liable to any defensive harm. On this view, for 
an MRT to act in a way that, given the evidence, she was morally permitted 
to act, insulates her from liability for any wrongful harms that result from 
what she does. After all, the possibility of these harms was already factored 
into the determination of whether the agent was conducting herself in a 
permissible way. To claim, ex post, that the agent is liable for harms 
resulting from a risk that was imposed justifiably ex ante seems to treat her 
unfairly. 
For example, because the driver, in Ferzan’s words, “behaves in a cautious 
and admirable way,” it seems unfair to claim that she is liable to defensive 
harm.18 David Rodin similarly argues that he is “intuitively uncomfortable” 
with the view that the driver is liable, since the “risk of injury which the 
driver imposes was not proscribed given that he had fulfilled all his 
obligations to minimize the risk.”19 The implicit claim here is: 
(1) Fulfilling all of one’s evidence-relative moral obligations precludes 
liability. 
Holding such a person liable seems to treat her unfairly. Accordingly, I will 
call this: 
The Argument from Unfairness 
It is unfair to hold an MRT liable. 
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If 1 is correct, MRTs are not liable at all, which means that the Complex 
Account (as well as the Simple Account) is mistaken. But I will attempt to 
show that the argument from unfairness fails on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with accepted standards of corrective justice. These standards 
permit us to force a wrongdoer to compensate victims even when she has 
imposed a harm that was permissible in both the evidence-relative and the 
fact-relative sense. If a forced compensation is a deprivation, and if imposing 
an unwanted deprivation is a harm, then the claim that evidence-relative 
impermissibility is a necessary condition of liability is incompatible with 
accepted standards of corrective justice. 
In common law, if a defendant has damaged or destroyed another’s property 
as a necessary means of preventing a much greater harm from befalling 
herself (as opposed to others or to the plaintiff) she can be legally liable to 
compensate the owner for the cost of the damaged incurred to the property. 
This is known as the “private-necessity defense.”20 The individual who is 
responsible for the harm imposed on the innocent would be liable to certain 
deprivations as a means of redressing the harms incurred, even though she 
did everything that morality could fairly ask of her. I will call this: 
The Compatibility Principle 
Liability to compensatory harms is compatible with the private-necessity 
defense. 
To use a canonical example, suppose that while out for a walk in a remote 
area, I am unforeseeably injured through no fault of my own. Loosing blood 
rapidly, I knock at the only cabin nearby—no one is home. So I break into 
the cabin to bandage my wounds and call for help. The illegal entry and 
theft are morally justified, since imposing a slight harm on the cabin owner 
(in the form of property damage) is the only way to prevent a much worse 
harm from befalling me. Consequently, infringing the cabin owner’s property 
rights is permissible. Though the illegal entry and the theft are morally 
justified, I am legally and morally liable for the cost of compensating the 
owner for the window I shattered and for the costs of the medical supplies I 
used. (One might argue that the costs should be imposed on the community. 
But we can suppose that I and the cabin owner reside in a failed or barely 
functioning state). 
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The compatibility principle, then, shows that we can be liable to certain 
deprivations even in cases where we act permissibly. Is it unfair to claim that 
though I acted in precisely the way that morality permitted me, I have lost 
my right not to be fined in compensation? Perhaps it is. But it would be 
more unfair to force the proper owner of the medical supplies to bear the cost 
of my forced entry and the loss of her bandages. We ought, then, to reject 1. 
A proponent of the argument from unfairness might try to accommodate the 
compatibility principle (and thereby salvage 1) by drawing a distinction 
between preventive and compensatory liability in the following way. Though 
the owner of the cabin is owed compensation for the deprivations I impose 
upon him by breaking into his cabin and pilfering his medical supplies, the 
owner cannot permissibly prevent me from doing so. Specifically, he cannot 
permissibly prevent me from doing what I have an all-things-considered 
agent-neutral reason to do—which is to save a life (namely, mine) at the cost 
of illicitly appropriating another’s medical supplies. He cannot prevent me 
from doing so, since (we can assume) he has a moral duty to allow me to use 
his supplies, on the grounds that the cost to him of doing so is minimal and 
the cost to me of his refusing to do so would be great. So the proponent of 
the argument from unfairness might replace 1 with: 
(2) One cannot be liable to preventive harm for a harm imposed permissibly. 
It should be noted that this claim concedes significant ground to the 
Complex Account of liability. If 2 is correct, then, an MRT is not liable to 
defensive violence, though she is liable to compensatory deprivations ex post. 
But even this concessionary response fails. The reason why I am liable to 
compensatory deprivations after I break into the cabin, but not to preventive 
violence beforehand, is that the agent-neutral justification that I have for 
pilfering the medical supplies is compatible with an ex post agent-neutral 
duty to compensate the cabin owner. After all, ex hypothesi, imposing 
compensatory deprivations on me does not come at the cost of my life, 
whereas imposing preventive harms on me would. Consequently, liability to 
preventive harm would indeed interfere with what I have a decisive agent-
neutral reason to do. 
Contrast this with the harms imposed by MRTs. Since the harm an MRT is 
imposing is permissible in only the evidence-relative sense and not the fact-
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relative sense, defensive violence against the MRT does not prevent her from 
doing what she has a fact-relative permission to do, simply because she has 
no such permission. Preventing me from breaking into the cabin prevents me 
from doing what I have a fact-relative permission to do, whereas preventing 
the conscientious driver or the mistaken resident from imposing their harms 
does not prevent them from doing what they have a fact-relative permission 
to do. 
The upshot is that the reasons to treat preventive harms differently from 
compensatory harms only apply to harms imposed in response to fact-relative 
permissible harms, such as those imposed in accordance with the private 
necessity defense. It does not apply to harms imposed in response to fact-
relative impermissible harms, such as those that MRTs impose. So 2 should 
be replaced with: 
(3) One cannot be liable to preventive harms for a harm imposed permissibly 
in the fact-relative sense. 
But 3 does not threaten the Complex Account, since that account concerns 
harms imposed impermissibly in the fact-relative sense. 
So where does this leave us? The proponent of the argument from unfairness 
tried to circumvent the apparent inconsistency between the compatibility 
principle and the claim that evidence-relative permissibility precludes 
liability, by arguing that only liability to compensatory harms is compatible 
with the defense of private necessity, and that liability to defensive harms is 
not—in which case there is room for the claim that MRTs are not liable to 
be defensively harmed. I responded to this by pointing out that the reasons 
for thinking that the defense of private necessity precludes liability to 
defensive harms does not apply to MRTs who pose fact-relative 
impermissible harms. So the proponent of the argument from unfairness is 
back where she started: the claim that it is wrong to hold the MRT liable for 
acting in an evidence-relative way is inconsistent with the compatibility 
principle, which says that liability is compatible with the defense of private 
necessity. 
Still, a proponent of the argument from unfairness might be on the right 
track in arguing that liability to preventive harms should be treated 
differently from liability to compensatory harms. Specifically, some might 
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argue that in addition to wrongdoing, blame is a necessary condition for a 
preventive harm. Ferzan adopts this view when she says “it seems that the 
only time that we may say a defender does the right thing is when he acts 
against a culpable aggressor.”21 On this account, the criterion of liability to 
defensive force is the wrongdoer’s culpable attempt to impose an unjust 
threat. This is the only sort of case in which a person can be defensively 
attacked without infringing or violating her rights (unless, of course, the 
attacker has consented to such an attack). Ferzan, then, is claiming: 
(4) One is liable to preventive harm only for a wrong imposed culpably. But 
culpability is not necessary for liability to compensatory harm. 
On this view, violence directed against those who are not at all culpable 
(which includes the conscientious driver or the mistaken resident, who do not 
even act negligently) is unjust, even when the nonculpable party is 
responsible for posing what is ultimately a fact-relative impermissible lethal 
threat. 
Contrary to initial appearances, 4 and 1 do not make the same sort of claim; 
the claim that one is not liable to preventive violence for a harm imposed 
nonculpably is not the same as the claim that one is not liable to preventive 
violence for a harm imposed permissibly in the evidence-relative sense. One 
can impose an evidence-relative impermissible risk nonculpably if one has a 
fully mitigating excuse, (such as duress or nonculpable ignorance). In this 
case, 4 would rule out liability, should the risk manifest. But 1 leaves open 
the possibility of liability. 
One can also impose an evidence-relative permissible risk culpably by doing 
so with the wrong intentions or for the wrong reasons. Suppose J is dying of 
disease which only a particular herb might cure. It has a 50 percent of doing 
so, and a 50 percent of causing an agonizing death. All things considered, it 
makes sense to administer the herb to her. But a villainous druggist does so, 
hoping that it causes the agonizing death. Suppose it does. The villain would 
be liable to compensatory harm (perhaps toward the victim’s estate) if 4 is 
correct, but not if 1 is correct. This is despite the fact that what the villain 
does is evidence-relative permissible, and despite the fact that a doctor with 
good intentions (or at least without bad ones) would not be similarly liable 
even if events unfolded in the same way. 
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So 4 is worth considering independently of 1.22 If 4, is correct, MRTs are not 
liable to defensive violence. Even though they impose harms impermissibly in 
the fact-relative sense, that they do so nonculpably immunizes them from 
defensive violence. 
But why is culpability required for preventive harms but not compensatory 
harms? Recall that in the aforementioned example I am liable for the cost of 
the medical supplies I pilfered and the damages I caused when I permissibly 
infringed the cabin owner’s property rights. Perhaps culpability is necessary 
for defensive and not compensatory harms because harms inflicted 
defensively are usually violent bodily harms, whereas compensatory harms 
usually take the form of financial deprivations. Because bodily harms are 
generally harder to justify than financial harms, it stands to reason that the 
conditions for permissibly imposing bodily harms are harder to satisfy. And 
one way to make the conditions harder to satisfy is by requiring culpability 
as a condition for liability to defensive harm. 
Accordingly, on this view, what grounds the claim that liability to defensive 
harms requires culpability is not that they are preventive rather than 
compensatory, but rather that they are bodily rather than financial harms. If 
this is correct, then we have a reason for thinking that MRTs are not liable 
to defensive violence: they are not liable because they are not culpable, and 
culpability is necessary for liability to bodily harms. 
This argument has some intuitive merit, in that liability to financial 
deprivations and liability to bodily violence seem to be different not merely 
in degree but in kind. But upon further inspection, this distinction cannot 
provide grounds for 4; that is, it cannot provide grounds for thinking that 
culpability is required for liability to preventive but not compensatory 
harms. 
Suppose I act negligently in a way that imposes a harm on both me and an 
innocent. We both suffer major injuries requiring a series of costly 
surgeries—without them we will suffer significant and permanent bodily 
harm. Suppose that I have the funds to finance my own surgeries, whereas 
the innocent does not. As a matter of civil law, it is not implausible to 
suppose that I can be sued successfully for the cost of the innocent’s 
surgeries—even if this means that I will not be able to afford my own 
surgeries. In this example, compensatory liability ex post does indeed result 
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in significant bodily harm of a nonculpable but responsible wrongdoer, as a 
side effect of preventing bodily harm from being inflicted on an innocent 
victim. 
If we are willing to say that nonculpable wrongdoers are liable to 
compensatory financial deprivations necessary to prevent a victim from 
suffering significant bodily harm, even if the wrongdoer will suffer such 
harms as a foreseeable side effect, then I do not see why we cannot say that 
nonculpable wrongdoers are liable to preventive defensive bodily harms. 
A proponent of 4—that is, of the view that only defensive harms and not 
compensatory harms require culpability—might respond by claiming that 
only intentional bodily harms require culpability. This is why the bodily 
harm resulting as a foreseen side effect of compensatory liability does not 
require culpability. But then the proponent of 4 would be left with the view 
that culpability is not necessary for liability to bodily harms that result as a 
side effect of engaging in defensive action. Returning to the example of the 
conscientious driver, suppose that the only way for us to save the pedestrian 
is by erecting a barrier into which the car will crash. If we think that 
culpability is necessary for liability to intentional defensive harm but not to 
merely foreseeable defensive harm, then we are forced into the conclusion 
that the driver is liable to harms caused by erecting the barrier (up to the 
maximum specified by the Complex Account). I suspect that proponents of 
the argument from unfairness would maintain that it is unfair to hold the 
conscientious driver morally liable to such harm—again, because the driver 
has conducted herself in accordance with the evidence-relative demands of 
morality. 
The upshot is that we cannot advert to the severity or type of defensive 
harms to support the view that defensive but not compensatory liability 
requires culpability—at least not without undermining the argument from 
unfairness. A proponent of 4 might respond in the following way: if a 
Complex Account is correct, then wouldn’t this mean that tort law should 
permit bodily harm as a means of compensatory liability? So, for example, if 
my argument against 4 is correct, doesn’t this mean that we have to allow a 
plaintiff to sue for ownership of a defendant’s kidney if the defendant caused 
wrongful and irreparable damage to the plaintiff’s kidney? 
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This is not so. The restrictions against harming manipulatively are 
significantly more stringent than those against harming eliminatively. For 
example, destroying a wrongful aggressor’s liver (perhaps by poisoning him) 
as a necessary means of preventing him from wrongfully killing an innocent 
might be permissible, even if it is impermissible to surgically transplant his 
liver into his victim as a means of preventing the victim’s death from the 
injuries caused by the aggressor’s wrongful attack. So even when a 
deprivation consisting of bodily harm has compensatory value, imposing such 
a harm can be impermissible, even if the same harm committed eliminatively 
would have been permissible ex ante. This is not because culpability is 
necessary for liability to bodily harm, but rather because harming 
manipulatively is significantly worse than harming eliminatively. 
The upshot is that there are indeed reasons why the restrictions on 
compensatory harms are more stringent than the restrictions on preventive 
harms—but none of them have to do with the culpability of the wrongdoer. 
As David Rodin points out, there are undoubtedly reasons why defensive and 
redress rights should be treated differently.23 He points out that self-defense 
is a morally risky activity, since those who are in a position to defend against 
wrongful harms are typically interested parties who have to act quickly, with 
little time to reflect on the moral complexities of liability, and with 
incomplete information about the apparent threat. Consequently, the 
decision to inflict defensive harm involves a substantial risk of wrongdoing. 
There are reasons of justice, then, to defer exercising defensive rights in favor 
of redress rights; ex post, we have the opportunity to properly determine 
whether and to what degree the apparent wrongdoer is liable. Still, one 
cannot be required to defer rights vindication to ex post redress when the 
rights infringed cannot be adequately compensated; the paradigm example of 
this sort of nonfungible good is one’s life itself—which is why we still allow 
liability to defensive violence. 
Considerations of justice might explain, then, why we ought to be 
conservative or cautious about the sort of harms to which rights-infringers 
are liable ex ante. But these reasons do not show that liability to such harms 
requires culpability. I conclude, then, that 4 is mistaken, on the grounds that 
it wrongly treats preventive harms differently from compensatory harms. If 
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culpability is a necessary basis for preventive harms, then it should be a 
necessary basis for compensatory harms as well. This would suggest: 
(5) One is liable only for harms imposed culpably. 
The problem with this view is that, like 1, it is inconsistent with the 
compatibility principle. That is, 5 denies that the defense of private necessity 
can serve as a basis for liability, except in cases where the defender acts 
culpably. Suppose the only way for me to save my own life which is 
wrongfully threatened by a thrown spear is to grab your arm and use it as a 
shield, causing you some superficial lacerations. There are agent-neutral 
consequentialist reasons for me to use you in this way, and you have an 
enforceable duty to allow yourself to be so used. I would be liable to 
compensate you for the harms I caused by infringing your rights (assuming 
the wrongful spear-thrower has escaped). But if 5 is correct, then I am liable 
to compensatory deprivations only if I use you culpably—either by using you 
in a context where I had no justification, or by using you in the case as 
described but with the malevolent intention to cause you to suffer. Though I 
certainly owe you compensation in these cases, the standard of corrective 
justice is that I also owe you in cases where I do not act culpably. This 
suggests that 5 is mistaken. 
To sum up: I have countered arguments against the Complex Account of 
liability by responding to the argument from unfairness. Recall that this 
argument said that MRTs cannot be liable for the harms they impose 
because they are acting in accordance with what morality fairly asks of them. 
I countered this argument by pointing out that it is incompatible with the 
accepted standards of corrective justice. Specifically, the defense of private 
necessity is compatible with liability to compensatory deprivations. I then 
considered the claim that one cannot be liable to defensive harms imposed 
permissibly. But this claim is correct only on a fact-relative reading of 
permissibility; MRTs impose harms permissibly only in the evidence-relative, 
and not the fact-relative sense. Finally, I considered the possibility that one 
cannot be liable to defensive harms unless one has acted culpably. But this, I 
argued, is ad hoc—either both preventive and compensatory harms require 
culpability or neither does. Only the former option, rather than the latter, 
grounds the argument from unfairness—and the former option requires 
rejecting the compatibility principle. 
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I conclude, then, that the argument from unfairness is mistaken: one cannot 
argue against the Complex Account by claiming that it would be unfair to 
hold the MRT liable for what she does. None of this shows, however, that 
MRTs such as the conscientious driver or the mistaken resident are morally 
liable to defensive harms. Indeed, in Anglo-American tort law, the 
conscientious driver (for instance) would not be legally liable even to 
compensate the pedestrian for any injuries she caused.24 But I think this is 
almost certainly for reasons having to do with the economic and social role 
that driving plays in first-world countries. It is regarded (correctly or not) as 
a socially and economically useful activity—one for which we are all generally 
better off, including nondrivers. Because the pedestrian benefits from this 
activity-type, the costs of the activity (conducted conscientiously) should not 
be borne by the driver. The perceived social utility of driving, then, rather 
than any implicit commitment to the nonliability of MRTs, explains why the 
conscientious driver would not be legally liable to compensate the pedestrian 
for any injuries she caused. To see this, we need but replace the example so 
that the MRT is engaged in an activity of a type that’s permissible, but not 
socially useful. 
Suppose I set off legal fireworks in my backyard. I take all reasonable 
precautions; but through no fault of my own, an errant rocket strikes a 
pedestrian in the eye. It is not obvious that I cannot be sued for the cost of 
the harm I have incurred. If we treated conscientious driving as an inherently 
risky activity, which is how we treat certain recreational sports (such as 
hunting), certain business activities (such as transporting volatile material), 
and ownership of certain exotic pets (such as venomous snakes), then 
conscientious drivers would indeed be liable for the harms they cause. In all 
these cases, should an accident occur harming an innocent victim, that victim 
would be owed compensation by the individual who engaged in the risky 
activity, even if she had taken all reasonable precautions. That is to say, the 
individual who is at least minimally responsible for the threat imposed on the 
innocent victim would be liable to certain deprivations as a means of 
redressing the harms incurred, even though she did everything that morality 
could fairly ask of her in the course of engaging in the activity in question. 
It is apparent, then, that a defense of the Complex Account of liability for 
MRTs amounts to a defense of the moral analogue of strict liability. I do not 
take myself to have provided a comprehensive defense of this here. Rather, I 
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have countered some arguments against it. Specifically, if what I have argued 
is correct, then we cannot deny that MRTs are liable simply by claiming that 
the activity in question was conducted nonculpably or evidence-relative 
permissibly. This is because the compatibility of liability with the defense of 
private necessity shows that neither evidence-relative impermissibility nor 
culpability is a necessary condition for liability. Any account of liability 
insisting that a person must deserve to be harmed or must engage in 
evidence-relative impermissible activity in order for the threatener to be 
liable is excessively restrictive—not because it rules out strict liability, but 
because it rules out compensatory liability in cases of private necessity. 
Perhaps this is all the worse for the supposed compatibility of compensatory 
liability with the defense of private necessity. But denying the compatibility 
principle would be a sizeable bullet to bite.25  
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